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Monetary Policy and Public Finances: 
Inflation Targets in a New Perspective 
CHRISTIAN H. BEDDIES*
This paper examines how the private sector, the monetary authority, and the fiscal
authority interact and concludes that unrestricted central bank independence may
not be an optimal way to collect seigniorage revenues or stabilize supply shocks.
Moreover, the paper shows that the implementation of an optimal inflation target
results in optimal shares of government finances—seigniorage, taxes, and the
spending shortfall—from society’s point of view but still involves suboptimal sta-
bilization. Even if price stability is the sole central bank objective, a positive infla-
tion target has important implications for the government’s finances, as well as for
stabilization. [JEL: E52, E62]
T
his paper examines the interplay between monetary and fiscal policies in an infla-
tion-targeting framework. In this vein, the paper asks the following question: can
an inflation target induce an independent central bank to provide the optimal rate of
inflation, resulting in optimal seigniorage, taxes, public spending, and output? Does
this also lead to optimal stabilization of aggregate supply shocks? The answer to the
first question is yes, while the answer to the second is no, and the paper shows why.
These issues have been analyzed in various ways. First, a strand of literature
has focused on the interaction between monetary policy and the private sector, and
thus on the credibility/flexibility trade-off.1 This approach, however, fails to take
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1See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985), Lohmann (1992), and Alesina and Grilli
(1992).into account the impact of monetary policy on public finances. Second, other
authors have employed a deterministic framework to explicitly model the
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. This approach has the weakness of
disregarding the implications of aggregate supply shocks.2 Finally, the inflation-
target literature aims at resolving the time inconsistency problem of monetary
policy but tends to overlook the fact that inflation targets could be used as a way of
providing the optimal level of seigniorage (see, for example, Svensson, 1995). The
aim here is to merge these ideas to derive implications for the optimal policy mix
and the optimal policy response to a supply shock.3
The paper extends the work by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) by allowing
for an aggregate supply shock and by investigating the merits of inflation targets
for public finances when the government interacts with an independent central
bank. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), following along the lines of Alesina and
Tabellini (1987), stress the importance of public debt and assume a constant ratio
of real base money holdings to nondistortionary output, that is, the inverse of
velocity.4Within this framework, they analyze the implications of alternative insti-
tutional arrangements—centralization versus decentralization, Nash versus
Stackelberg—for society’s welfare. Whichever arrangement is preferable depends
on society’s preferences for inflation, output, and public spending, as well as the
structural parameters of the economy, such as real base money holdings and out-
standing public debt.
This paper extends this analysis in several directions. First, it considers the
link between monetary and fiscal policies in a stochastic model, that is, it includes
an aggregate supply shock. Second, it provides intuition as to why it makes a dif-
ference whether the government faces a constrained optimization problem in
which public spending is one of the arguments in the government’s objective func-
tion, or whether public expenditure is given as a residual by substituting the bud-
get constraint into the policymakers’ objective functions. The implication of the
constrained problem is that the central bank, when decentralizing its policies, does
not automatically internalize the government’s budget constraint. Thus it does not
make a difference whether the bank cares about public spending, which is in con-
trast to the existing literature (e.g., Alesina and Tabellini, 1987; and Debelle and
Fischer, 1994).5 The paper then shows how an inflation target can bring society
closer to the second-best equilibrium by serving as a substitute for the central
bank’s disregard for the government’s budget constraint. The paper’s final exten-
sion is to analyze an “extreme” interpretation of the Maastricht proposal of price
stability as the main objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) on a national
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2See, for example, Tabellini (1986 and 1988), Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Jensen (1994), and
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997). Exceptions are Debelle and Fischer (1994), and Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1999).
3A large body of literature has also focused on the seigniorage hypothesis as part of an optimal taxa-
tion problem. See, for example, Mankiw (1987), Fukuta and Shibata (1994), Froyen and Waud (1995),
Gros and Vandille (1995), Evans and Amey (1996), and Click (1998). For an empirical investigation of
developing countries, see Ashworth and Evans (1998). 
4This parameter is assumed to be unity in the Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and Debelle and Fischer
(1994) models.
5Except where the central bank would be “Stackelberg” leader with respect to the government.basis. Again, a positive inflation target has interesting implications for smoothing
the government’s financing requirement over the sources of finance, as well as for
stabilization.
The analysis is formulated as a game involving the private sector, the mone-
tary authority, and the fiscal authority. The main results can be summarized as fol-
lows. A social planner, when in charge of monetary and fiscal policy, can achieve
only a second-best equilibrium, as lump-sum taxes are ruled out.6 The social plan-
ner then has to use alternative sources of finance—distortionary taxes, seignior-
age, and the shortfall of public expenditure from its desired target. The resulting
second-best equilibrium involves optimal positive mean inflation. Therefore,
depending on the tax base—that is, the size of real base money holdings—raising
seigniorage revenues to some extent appears optimal, which is in contrast to the
various zero inflation rules studied in the literature. Since discretionary policy-
making is ruled out, the optimal positive inflation rate derives from optimal rev-
enue considerations and not from a desire to raise output via surprise inflation.
Aggregate supply shocks cause inflation, taxes, spending, and output to fluctuate
(second best) optimally around their respective means. 
The policy outcome under the assumption that a benevolent policymaker is in
charge of monetary and fiscal policy serves as a benchmark case. Once policies
are decentralized, that is, monetary policy is delegated to an independent but com-
mitted central bank, both financing and stabilization are distorted. Since the cen-
tral bank does not optimize subject to the government’s budget constraint and
therefore ignores the social value of seigniorage, the entire financing requirement
has to be met by the fiscal authority. The central bank does not provide any
seigniorage revenues, either through budgetary considerations, or through a desire
to boost output closer to its target through surprise inflation. Therefore, the fiscal
authority has to rely to a greater extent on taxes—causing output to move further
away from its desired target—and a larger expenditure gap. In terms of stabiliza-
tion, inflation/seigniorage fluctuates less, while output and spending vary more.
As a result, the social loss in this scenario is larger than under centralization. The
way out of this dilemma is to impose a non-state-contingent inflation target on the
central bank. The appealing feature of this target is that it provides the optimal
level of expected seigniorage. This result highlights that any output effect in the
targeting regime derives from lower taxation, since the amount of taxes necessary
to finance a given financing requirement depends on the level of seigniorage pro-
vided by the central bank. The optimal inflation target is allowed to vary, depend-
ing on the base for the inflation tax. At the limit, where real base money holdings
tend to zero, the seigniorage motive vanishes and the optimal inflation target
becomes zero. In terms of society’s loss, this solution—in which the central bank
is independent but subject to an optimal inflation target—dominates the arrange-
ment in which the independent central bank has no inflation target, but is still infe-
rior to the centralized case. The last scenario is one in which controlling inflation
is the sole objective of the central bank. While the model’s inflation target ensures
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6For an analysis with lump-sum taxes in the deterministic case, see Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997),
and, in the stochastic case, Beddies (1997).that the means of inflation/seigniorage, output taxes, and spending are at their sec-
ond-best level, the central bank does not stabilize supply shocks at all, leaving the
entire burden of smoothing the supply shock to the fiscal authority. Regarding the
social loss, this solution is inferior to the centralized setting and the decentralized
setting with the inflation target. Whether this extreme form of central bank inde-
pendence is preferable to a central bank that cares about output but is not subject
to an optimal inflation target depends on the significance of supply shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I sets up the basic
model. Section II considers the social planner’s problem as a benchmark case.
Section III explores the decentralized setting and the implications of inflation tar-
gets. Section IV analyzes an “extreme” form of the Maastricht proposal for mon-
etary policy—a framework in which the central bank only cares about inflation.
Section V concludes the paper and gives some ideas of how to extend our model.
The appendices provide derivations in support of our findings.
I. The Setup
The model has three players, namely, the private sector (represented by a trade
union), the monetary authority (central bank), and the fiscal authority (govern-
ment).7 The trade union seeks to minimize deviations of the real wage rate from a
particular target. For convenience and without loss of generality, this real wage tar-
get is normalized to zero. Thus, trade unions set the log of the nominal wage rate
equal to the expected price level, that is, w = pe. To give the monetary and fiscal
authorities an incentive to engage in surprise inflation, nominal wage contracts are
assumed to be signed before the policies are selected. Our model is stochastic
rather than deterministic, in contrast to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) and
Alesina and Tabellini (1987). Thus, we allow for the possibility that the economy
can be hit by shocks. Given these assumptions, normalized output, y, is given by8
y = p – pe – t + e, (1)
where y is the log of real output; p and pe denote the actual and expected rate of
inflation, respectively; t is the tax rate on output; and e is an aggregate supply
shock, distributed normally with zero mean and variance se2. From equation (1),
it follows that in a rational expectations equilibrium, where Et–1(pt) = pt
e, the
long-run expected output level, denoted by the unconditional mean E(y), is equal
to –t. To achieve E(y) = 0, one has to remove the distortions arising from output
taxation. The model also allows for nontax distortions, which are measured by
y* > 0.9 Note that y* represents the first-best level of output in the absence of any
distortion. Hence the first-best output level y* can be achieved only by removing
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7The basic model uses the framework of Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997). Also, see Beddies (1997).
8This is standard in the literature. See, for example, Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Beddies (1997)
for the case with shocks, and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) and Alesina and Tabellini (1987) for the case
without shocks.
9This could be labor market union power and/or goods market monopoly power. See Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1997), who consider those nontax distortions as an implicit tax on output.both the tax and the nontax distortions. The natural way to achieve the first best
and to remove these distortions would be to subsidize output by setting y* = –t,
whereby the negative tax represents the subsidy on output. This results in
E(y)=y*, which offsets the implicit tax on output caused by the nontax distortions.
The preferences of the society are specified in a social loss function defined
over inflation, output, and public spending.10 The social loss function is given by
(2)
where xS is the weight that the society places on inflation and mS represents the
weight that the society places on public spending, both relative to the output objec-
tive; p is the rate of inflation; y is the log of real output as defined in equation (1);
y* represents the first-best nondistortionary level of output; g is public spending;
and g* denotes the spending target. For simplicity, the target inflation rate is
assumed to be zero.11 The social loss (equation 2) is assumed to be an increasing
function of the deviation from targets.




The weights, corresponding to the respective targets in the social, the central
bank’s, and the government’s loss function, may or may not differ.
Within this public finance framework, the government has to choose its poli-
cies subject to a budget constraint. This budget constraint in terms of shares of
nondistortionary output is given by12
g + (1 + r)b + (1 + r + pe – p)d = t + kp, (5)
where g denotes government spending; b is the outstanding stock of indexed
single-period government debt; and d represents the initial real value of nonin-
dexed single-period debt. The right-hand side of equation (5) represents the
sources of revenue. Thereby t is the revenue from distortionary taxes and kp is the
revenue from seigniorage, with k ³ 0 as the constant ratio of real money holdings
L y y g g M M M M M = + - ( ) + - ( ) [ ] >
1
2 0 2 2 2 x p m x m * * , , .
L y y g g F F F F F = + - ( ) + - ( ) [ ] >
1
2 0 2 2 2 x p m x m * * , , ,
L y y g g S S S S S = + - ( ) + - ( ) [ ] >
1
2 0 2 2 2 x p m x m * * , , ,
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10For an identical treatment of the social loss function, see, for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1987),
Jensen (1994), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), and Beddies (1997).
11Sections III and IV explore the situation where the central bank is allowed to have a positive infla-
tion target.
12See Appendix I for details. In deriving this budget constraint, the paper follows Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1997), but it does not analyze the case of unlimited access to lump-sum taxes. See Beddies
(1997) on this issue considered within a stochastic model.and nondistortionary output.13 The key assumption underlying this budget con-
straint is that all debt sold at the end of the previous period has to be repaid, while
no new debt is issued in the present period. One can interpret this as a two-period
game in which the sole focus is the last period. This assumption has the advantage
of simplifying the algebra substantially. Hence the issue of the intertemporal allo-
cation of tax distortions, inflation, and public spending is ignored. To ensure that
there is a demand for government debt, the return on indexed debt must be at least
as high as the real ex ante return on an outside investment opportunity, r.
Regarding the nominal debt, investors set expected inflation as a markup on the
real ex ante rate r; thus, the nominal interest rate on nonindexed debt is r + pe (see,
for example, Dornbusch, 1996). To ensure a clear separation between the govern-
ment’s sources of finance and the expenditures that have to be financed by these
sources, that is, the government’s financing requirement, the budget constraint
(equation 5) is rewritten:14
F º g* + y* + (1 + r)(b + d) = (t + y*) + kp + (g* – g) + (p – pe)d. (6)
The government has to finance the spending target; the output subsidy to
(partly) offset the labor market distortions, y*; and the repayment and servicing
costs of the indexed and the nominal debt. The right-hand side of equation (6)
accounts for the source of finance: “revenues” from inflating away nominal debt,
(p – pe)d; revenues via the shortfall of public spending from its target (g*– g);
seigniorage revenues, kp; and, finally, revenues from explicit and implicit taxes on
output, (t + y*).15 The paper assumes that the financing requirement does not
exceed production. Finally, the private sector’s expectations are assumed to be
rational and hence satisfy (conditional on the information set available in the pre-
vious period, t – 1, that is, containing all information up to and including period
t – 1) the following:
Et – 1 (pt) = pt
e. (7)
II. A Benevolent Policymaker
This section shall serve as a benchmark case for judging alternative outcomes in
the decentralized policy setting. Suppose that a committed, benevolent policy-
maker is in charge of setting monetary and fiscal policies. She thus can take
account of the private sector’s expectations. The optimization problem is
Christian H.Beddies
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13For simplicity, the potentially distortionary effects of the inflation tax on the demand for real money
is not considered, thus k is not defined as a function of expected inflation. See, for example, Calvo and
Leiderman (1992) and Calvo and Guidotti (1993) for models incorporating the money demand implica-
tions of the inflation tax, and Cagan (1956) in a hyperinflation framework.
14The spending and the output target on both sides in equation (5) are added and terms rearranged.
15Labor market distortions are measured by the deviation of the first-best output level, y*, from the
actual output level, y, in the absence of any tax distortions, where E(y) would be zero.characterized by minimizing the loss function (equation 2) subject to the budget
constraint (equation 6), to the rational expectations constraint (equation 7) and to
the supply function (equation 1). Hence, the Lagrangian is
(8)
where p, t, and g are the instruments; l is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the government’s budget constraint; and d is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the expectations constraint. Minimizing equation (8) with respect to p, pe, t,
g, l, and d yields the following first-order conditions:
xsp + (p – pe – t + e – y*) + l(–k–d) + E(d) = 0. (9)
–(p – pe – t + e – y*) + ld – d = 0. (10)
–(p – pe – t + e – y*) – l = 0. (11)
ms(g – g*) + l = 0. (12)
F – (t + y*) – kp – (g*– g) – (p – pe)d = 0. (13)
Et – 1 (pt) – pt
e = 0. (14)
Combining equations (10), (11), and (12) with equation (13), taking rational
expectations (note that Et – 1 (pt) = pt
e; see equation 14) into account, and using
equation (9), we obtain
(15)
where equation (15), the expectations of the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the expectations constraint, is the (average) marginal cost of expected
inflation. Thus, within this commitment framework, the policymaker under-
stands that the benefit of higher inflation comes at the cost of higher average
expected inflation. This cost is reflected in the right-hand side of equation (15).
For example, a higher financing requirement, F, makes seigniorage more valu-
able but at the same time increases the marginal cost of expected inflation. At
the optimum, costs and benefits have to be equal. Substituting equation (15)
into equation (9), solving the above first-order conditions, and imposing ratio-
nal expectations (equation 7), we obtain the following equilibrium policy out-
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Because the model abstracted from the unlimited access to lump-sum taxes,
the above equilibrium is second best. In contrast to the literature dealing with pol-
icy games between the monetary authority and the private sector, the second-best
optimal solution here involves optimal positive mean inflation. Depending on the
size of k, taxing real base money holdings to some extent, in order to finance part
of the public expenditures, appears to be optimal.16
By inspection of equations (16) through (19), one can verify that a higher gov-
ernment financing requirement raises the means of inflation and explicit taxes,
while reducing the mean of public expenditure. Moreover, output moves farther
away from its target, because of increased taxes, while the optimal relative vari-
ability between inflation, taxes, spending, and output is not affected. Hence, sup-
ply-side shocks are smoothed out over output and the three sources of finance,
independent of the financing requirement. The social loss necessarily increases
with a raise in the financing requirement, as all actual outcomes move farther away
from their respective targets (see Appendix II on the social loss).
Societies with a lower k (that is, higher velocity) experience a lower optimal
mean and a lower variance of seigniorage (see equation 16) because the taxable
base is smaller. Thus, in these countries, seigniorage is of less importance than in
countries where real base money holdings are higher and, hence, the base for the
inflation tax is larger. When regarding output deviations (equation 19) and spend-
ing deviations (equation 18) from their respective targets, the opposite is true.
Means and variances are higher if k is smaller. Not surprisingly, the mean of
implicit and explicit taxes (equation 17) also increases when k becomes smaller,
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16In Andrabi (1997), seigniorage passively adjusts to the budget constraint as a residual tax, while this
paper treats it as an instrument. However, his setup is purely decentralized.
17The effect on the tax variance stems from the reduced inflation variance, which is already putting
pressure on output stabilization.seigniorage is that the government’s financing requirement has to be met by less
spending and increased taxes, resulting in a larger gap between actual output and
its nondistortionary target. The same argument applies to the task of stabilizing
supply shocks. At the limit, where k tends to zero, it is no longer optimal to use
seigniorage as a source of finance. Hence, inflation responds only to the supply
shock to maintain the optimal relative variability among output, inflation, and the
remaining financing sources. As a result, F needs to be financed entirely by
implicit and explicit output taxes and by the shortfall of spending from its target.
If society views inflation as especially important and consequently increases
the weight attached to inflation, xS, it can reduce the mean of inflation as well as
its variance. This “gain,” however, comes at the cost of higher mean distortionary
taxes and, hence, less output, and it also moves public spending away from its tar-
get. It further induces output and spending to be more variable, and thus transfers
the burden of stabilizing shocks from inflation to output and spending. The impact
of different inflation weights on the variance of distortionary taxes depends on the
parameters but has a likely negative sign, if society cares sufficiently about spend-
ing as well.18
A higher weight on public spending, mS, decreases the gap between public
spending and its target and reduces its variance. This implies that the means of
seigniorage, output, and distortionary taxes have to increase to meet the financing
requirement, because being more concerned about public spending diminishes its
value as a financing source. The task of smoothing out the supply shock is increas-
ingly transferred to inflation and output. The tax variance, however, is decreasing
in the spending weight, mS, in order not to put additional pressure on output.
Higher nominal debt ratios undoubtedly increase the government’s financing
requirement.  As a result, seigniorage/inflation is higher, distortionary taxes increase,
and output as well as public expenditures move farther away from their respective tar-
gets. The fact that the supply shock is positively related to output and thus to taxation
implies that debt is positively related to taxes, reducing the impact on output. The
same argument holds for public spending. The impact of higher nominal debts on
inflation is ambiguous but has a likely negative sign.19 This implies that the negative
inflation response to the supply shock should be smaller. The economics behind this
result is that unanticipated inflation is valuable for decreasing the real value of the
nominal debt, which has to be repaid. As a positive shock reduces inflation, however,
higher nominal debts imply that this response should be smaller.
III. The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Public Finances
This section investigates an institutional arrangement in which the central bank is
independent of the government. The underlying assumption here is that the
monetary and the fiscal authorities move simultaneously; hence, they act in a
(noncooperative) Nash fashion. The aim of this section is to investigate the possi-
ble advantages of inflation targets in improving society’s welfare.
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18More precisely, the tax variance is decreasing in the inflation weight if mS(k + d) > 1.
19That is, the effect is negative if (1 + k + d)2/xS > 1 + 1/mS.Monetary Commitment: No Inflation Target
Many authors have argued that the inflation bias story is overdone. Why should an
independent central bank have an incentive to fool the private sector if doing so
does not help anyone?20 In this vein, the central bank is assumed to commit to
sticking to the ex ante optimal policy. Thus, its optimization problem is character-
ized by minimizing the loss function (equation 4), subject to the rational expecta-
tions constraint (equation 7) and the supply function (equation 1). The Lagrangian
is hence given by
(20)
where p is the central bank’s instrument and d is the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the rational expectations constraint. Minimizing equation (20) with
respect to p, pe, and d, we obtain the following first-order conditions:
xMp + (p – pe – t + e – y*) + E(d) = 0 (21)
– (p – pe – t + e – y*) – d = 0 (22)
Et – 1 (pt) – pt
e = 0. (23)
Note that the above first-order conditions show that it makes no difference
whether the central bank cares about spending or not, that is, it does not matter
whether mM = 0 or not. The government’s optimization problem is given by mini-
mizing the loss function (equation 3), subject to the budget constraint (equation 6)
and the supply function (equation 1).21 Thus the Lagrangian is
(24)
By minimizing equation (24) with respect to t, g, and l, we obtain the fol-
lowing first-order conditions:
– (p – pe – t + e – y*) – l = 0 (25)
mF(g – g*) + l = 0 (26)
F – (t + y*) – kp – (g*– g) – (p – pe)d = 0. (27)
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20See, for example, McCallum (1995); Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1996); and Blinder (1997) on
this issue.
21Note that the government does not choose inflation. Thus it cannot take account of the private sec-
tor’s rational expectations.The equivalent of equation (15) in Section II is obtained by combining equa-
tions (22), (25), and (26) with equation (27), taking rational expectations into
account (note that Et – 1(pt) = pt
e; see equation 23) and using equation (21):
(28)
where equation (28) is the (average) marginal cost of expected inflation. Note that
central bank independence implies that the central bank does not internalize the
government’s budget constraint and thus does not have any temptation to devalue
the nonindexed debt d. Technically, the term (1 + d) in equation (15) does not
appear in equation (28). Substituting equation (28) into equation (21), using equa-






Decentralization here has obvious effects. The central bank does not internalize
the budget constraint of the government and hence ignores the social value of
seigniorage as a source of finance.22As is easily seen from equation (29), inflation—
and thus seigniorage—merely fluctuates around a zero mean. Hence, the zero infla-
tion rules, as, for example, studied by Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992), fail to
consider that, as long as base money holdings are positive, inflation has some social
value as a source of taxation. As a result, the entire burden of meeting the govern-
ment’s financing requirement rests on distortionary taxes, leading to a greater output
shortfall, caused by insufficient subsidies, and the spending shortfall.
This result can also be looked at in a more technical manner. The model is
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22Also, see Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) and Beddies (1997).chooses its policies subject to a budget constraint. In contrast to this view, some
other authors, such as Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Jensen (1994), Debelle and
Fischer (1994), and Huang and Padilla (1995), transform the constrained opti-
mization problem into an unconstrained one by substituting the budget constraint
into the loss function (via spending). As a result, a central bank has to internalize
the government’s budget constraint if it cares about public spending (mM > 0), that
is, if it has the same preferences as society or the government.23 However, in prac-
tice, why would the independent central bank optimize subject to the govern-
ment’s budget constraint? Therefore, this paper’s definition ensures that there is no
need to justify why preferences among society, the government, and the central
bank should be different—as opposed to, for example, Debelle and Fischer (1994),
who merely assume different preferences.24
Assuming that xM = xS, the paper finds that stabilization also differs from the
second best. With an independent central bank, the variance of inflation/seignior-
age is lower, while the output and spending variances are higher [compare equa-
tions (16), (18), and (19) with equations (29), (31), and (32)]. The intuition behind
this result is as follows. As the central bank does not internalize the government’s
budget constraint, it fails to account for the effect of unanticipated inflation on the
value of repayable nominal debt. For that reason, inflation responds to a lower
extent to the supply shock, producing a higher variability of output and spending.
Furthermore, the variance of implicit and explicit taxes (t + y*) is only lower with
the independent central bank if mS(k + d) > 1 (see equations 17 and 30). Thus, it
appears that low-debt countries can lower the variability of their tax system by
centralizing policies. High-debt countries, however, are better off in terms of the
tax variability by decentralizing policies, given that k is equally low.
The impact of a change in the structural parameters of the economy, k and
d, and the political parameters, xS and mS, on the means and the variances of
seigniorage, taxes, the spending shortfall, and the output shortfall are the same
as discussed in Section II, except for two important differences. First, the mean
sources of finance in the decentralized setting do not depend upon k. However,
at the limit, if k tends to zero, that is, seigniorage is of insignificant importance,
decentralization “seems” to be attractive. The means of the sources of finance
(seigniorage, taxes, and the spending shortfall) coincide with those under cen-
tralized commitment (compare equations 16–19 with equations 29–32 for
k ® 0). Second, the variance of inflation/seigniorage is strictly decreasing in d,
no matter how important society views public spending and output relative to
inflation. The reason for this result is that the central bank does not balance the
impact of unanticipated inflation on repayable nominal debt against the prefer-
ences of society.
Regarding the welfare of the society, within this setup benevolent policymak-




23This argument necessarily disappears in the centralized setting.
24Thus, in their model, with respect to discretionary policy, fiscal parameters enter the inflation out-
turn via the tax effect on output and not through revenue considerations.Monetary Commitment: An Optimal Inflation Target
In practice, most central banks, at least in the industrialized countries, are more or
less independent of the government. Some governments, however, still have the
power to set the targets for their national monetary policy. We will use this obser-
vation to examine whether the finance dilemma analyzed above can be solved by
the use of an inflation target. Suppose the central bank would choose its policy
subject to the following objective function:
(33)
where the only difference from equation (4) (and equation 2 if assuming equal
weights) is the target inflation rate pT. Since we have shown in the previous section
that the central bank does not internalize the government’s budget constraint and
thus ignores the social value of seigniorage, we examine now whether pT can be cho-
sen in such a way that the central bank provides the optimal level of seigniorage.
Going through the same steps as earlier, we can show that by setting pT equal to
kmSF/(xS + xSmS + mSk2) and assuming that mF = mS and xM = xS, the optimal mean





The major drawback of this analysis is that the implementation of a positive
inflation target results in the optimal mean shares of finance, as if a benevolent
policymaker had chosen monetary and fiscal policies. Thus, compared with the
centralized case, an independent central bank can be induced to deliver the optimal
level of mean seigniorage merely by implementing an optimal inflation target.25
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25Note that this is different from the Svensson (1995) inflation target that is imposed to remove the
inflationary bias that arises from discretionary policymaking.central bank provides the optimal level of financing to the government. Since, as
a result, government taxes can be lower than in the case without the inflation tar-
get, the output shortfall, as well as the spending shortfall, is smaller. It is impor-
tant to note here that positive mean inflation does not derive from an incentive to
boost output via surprise inflation, since it was assumed that the central bank is
committed for the reasons explained above, but from optimal revenue share con-
siderations imposed by the inflation target.
The fact that this paper’s inflation target is optimal, in the sense that it
ensures the optimal share of finances, is best seen by looking at the parameter k.
If k = 0, the equations in Section II show that the optimal inflation rate—and,
thus, seigniorage—is zero. The above analysis easily verifies that, in this sce-
nario, the optimal inflation target becomes zero, resulting in mean shares of
finance, as if the benevolent policymaker had been in charge. Since the inflation
target is non-state-contingent, stabilization is still suboptimal compared with the
benevolent case.
Regarding society’s welfare, the targeting regime of this section is still infe-
rior to that of the social planner. However, a comparison between the losses result-
ing from pure central bank independence and central bank independence with the
optimal inflation target shows that the targeting regime is preferable to the regime
without the inflation target (see Appendix II for formal details).
IV. Inflation as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy
The desire of some European countries to establish a European Central Bank
(ECB) that is especially concerned with inflation—that is, concerned about low
and stable prices—is the motivation for this section.26 On a national level, the
monetary requirement for participating in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) is the establishment of an independent central bank whose main concern
is seen to be inflation. Following along these lines, this section considers an
extreme central bank that is only concerned with inflation.27 This case is repre-
sented by the specification in equation (38) below.28 Technically, this coincides
with the assumption of an infinitely conservative central banker.
A General Inflation Target




26To achieve the ultimate goal of price stability, the ECB targets money growth like the Bundesbank,
for which authors such as Bernanke and Mihov (1996) and Clarida and Gertler (1996) find evidence that
it would be better characterized as an inflation targeter, rather than a monetary targeter.
27Nevertheless, in terms of the loss function, Alesina and Grilli (1992), when examining the ECB, fol-
low Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Rogoff (1985).
28Note that an arrangement such as EMU coincides with one of centralized monetary policy and
decentralized fiscal policy. See, for example, Sibert (1994).
29Rankin (1998) also captures the idea of (extreme) conservatism in this way. However, he does not
consider the possibility of having a positive inflation target or shocks.(38)
where pT denotes the central bank’s inflation target. Given equation (38), one can
immediately establish the solution to the central bank’s problem:
p = pT, (39)
which implies that inflation is always at its target. The government still faces the
optimization problem of the previous section. Thus, its first-order conditions are
still given by the equations (25)–(27). Solving equation (39) and equations
(25)–(27) jointly and imposing the condition of rational expectations, equation (7),
one arrives at (assuming that mF = mS) the following:




These results, characterized in equations (40)–(43), have some interesting impli-
cations. Whatever target inflation rate the central bank has in mind, inspection of
equation (41) immediately shows that any positive rate of inflation reduces the
necessity for distortionary taxes, as long as k is positive. Furthermore, output and
public spending are closer to their respective targets, equations (42) and (43). The
above-derived solution, however, also reveals that the entire burden of stabilizing the
aggregate supply shock lies on fiscal policy and output. The reason for this is that
unanticipated inflation is not available. The central bank does not care about output,
given the specified loss function (equation 38). Necessarily, a government concerned
about meeting fiscal criteria such as those defined in the Maastricht Treaty faces
trade-offs among higher taxes, lower expenditures, and lower output subsidies.
A Specific Inflation Target
Turning to the central bank’s inflation target, pT, if the government can impose an
inflation target that provides the desired level of seigniorage, as specified in the
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which gives the same shares of the mean financing sources as in the case where the
benevolent policymaker was in charge. Thus, although the central bank does not have
output in its objective function, the imposed inflation target ensures that expected out-
put is at its second best level. Implicitly, the central bank, by implementing the target,
acts as if it cared about average output and the government’s budget constraint. The
intuition behind this result is as before, namely, that by providing the optimal level of
seigniorage, the government has to rely to a lesser extent on taxes. The decreased
reliance on taxes has a positive effect on output. Since this scenario considers a cen-
tral bank that is committed to stick to the ex ante optimal policy, this result again high-
lights that any output effect derives from taxation, which itself depends on the level
of seigniorage provided by the central bank. However, as the central bank is assumed
to explicitly care only about inflation in its objective function, the inflation target can-
not achieve optimal stabilization. Thus, extreme forms of central bank independence
might not be optimal.30 Depending on the size of k, seigniorage should be a part of
finance. The above-specified target ensures that, if k ® 0 at the limit, the seigniorage
motive, as well as inflation, vanishes.31 Thus, the commitment/discretion discussion
is not an issue as long as the government sticks to the inflation target. If the govern-
ment cares about staying in office, why should it then not try to act in the interest of
the private sector? In that connection, Goodhart (1993, p. 8) states: “As Lincoln said,
you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” The social loss under this arrange-
ment, however, is higher than it would be in the case in which the bank also cares
about output stabilization and faces the inflation target. Compared to the case where
the central bank does care about output stabilization but does not face an inflation tar-
get, the welfare implications are ambiguous and depend on the size of the supply
shock variance (again, see Appendix II for a formal derivation).
V. Conclusion
This paper has focused on the interplay between monetary and fiscal policies
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30See, for example, Goodhart (1993) for an excellent discussion of the issue of central bank
independence.
31The reason for this result is that the optimal inflation target in this scenario is zero. Note that this has
nothing to do with the Svensson (1995) approach, where a “negative” inflation target (given that society’s
inflation target is zero) is required in order to remove the inflationary bias. The positive inflation target here
is designed to provide the government with optimal seigniorage revenues, as in the previous section.of the explicit inclusion of issues of stabilization in a public finance framework
and the implications of inflation targets for public finances. The paper concludes
that unrestricted central bank independence may not be optimal from society’s
point of view, regardless of whether the bank cares only about inflation or about
both output and inflation. In terms of society’s welfare, in the absence of a benev-
olent policymaker, the most appealing solution is to implement an optimal infla-
tion target for the independent central bank, given that the bank also cares about
output.
Given the paper’s way of specifying the preferences of society and the poli-
cymakers, neither a fully independent central bank without the above-specified
optimal inflation target nor a central bank that cares only about inflation (even if
given an optimal inflation target) will generate a preferable outcome from soci-
ety’s point of view, compared with an independent central bank mindful of all
arguments in society’s loss function and having an optimal inflation target.
This paper assumed that all debt has to be repaid within the current period. In
light of EMU, the model could be extended to investigate the Maastricht deficit
criterion by allowing for debt accumulation. It could also be extended to allow for
fiscal policy interactions between sovereign fiscal authorities within the union,
which together interact with the centralized monetary authority, the ECB. Thus,
one could focus on the public good character of fiscal policy. Since the European
Community lacks a powerful federal government, one could investigate a situation
in which the decentralized fiscal authorities can build coalitions to minimize the
spillover effects of their fiscal decisions into other union countries. To capture the
potentially distortionary effects of the inflation tax on the demand for real money
balances, one could also endogenize the real base money holdings parameter.
These issues are left for future research.
APPENDIX I
Derivation of Government Budget Constraint
As in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), real money balances in period t are given by Mt/Pt = kY*,
where Y* is the output level in the absence of any distortions (the antilog of y*) and k ³ 0 is the
constant ratio of real money holdings and nondistortionary output (given by k = Mt/(PtY*).
Hence, (Mt – Mt – 1)/Mt = (Pt – Pt – 1)/Pt.32 Under the assumption that the tax distortions are not
too large, revenues from distortionary taxes can be approximated by ttPtY*.33 Lump-sum taxes
are given by qtPtY*. Denoting by Gt the level of government spending, by Bt the amount of
indexed single-period debt, by Dt the amount of nonindexed single-period debt sold at the end
of the previous period against the price Pt – 1 and interest rates rBt and rDt, respectively, and,
finally, by (Mt – Mt – 1), the increase in the nominal money supply, the nominal government bud-
get constraint is given by (also, see Jensen, 1994)
PtGt + (1 + rBt)PtBt + (1 + rDt)Pt – 1Dt = ttPtY* + qtPtY* + (Mt – Mt – 1) + Pt(Bt + 1 + Dt + 1). (A1)
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32The requirement for this to hold is that nondistortionary output Y* is independent of the tax rate t.
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) or Canzoneri (1985) use an identical simplification.
33See, for example, Alesina and Tabellini (1987), who also use the approximation Y » Y*.Dividing equation (A1) by PtY*, using the result pt = (Pt – Pt – 1)/Pt, and approximating
(1 + rDt)Pt – 1/Pt by (1 + rDt – pt), the government budget constraint (equation A1) can be rewrit-
ten in terms of shares of nondistortionary output:
gt + (1 + rBt)bt + (1 + rDt – pt)dt = tt + qt + kpt + bt + 1 + dt + 1. (A2)
To ensure that investors are willing to buy government debt, the interest rate on indexed
debt should be as high as the ex ante real rate of return of an outside investment opportunity—
r, say. Regarding nominal, nonindexed debt, the investor simply sets expected inflation as a
markup on this ex ante real rate r to compensate for any expected inflation during the maturity
of the debt. Hence, the nominal interest rate on nonindexed government debt is equal to r + pe.
Thus the government budget constraint stated in equation (A2), dropping time subscripts and
assuming that no new debt is issued, satisfies
g + (1 + r)b + (1 + r + pe – p)d = t + q + kp,
which (without lump-sum taxes) is the budget constraint stated in equation (5) in the text.
APPENDIX II
Comparison of Social Loss in Alternative Central Banking Regimes
This appendix compares the social loss (equation 2) under benevolent policymaking, BP; cen-
tral bank independence, CI; central bank independence with an optimal inflation target, CIT;
and central bank independence where the bank is only concerned with inflation but has an
optimal inflation target, CCIT. The social loss for the alternative regimes is obtained by substi-
tuting the respective policy outcomes into the social loss function (equation 2), assuming that
players share the same preferences, that is, x = xS = xF = xM and m = mS = mF = mM. It is then
straightforward to show that
LBP < LCIT < LCI (A3)
LBP < LCIT < LCCIT
LCI xLCCIT.
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(A11)Note that the coefficient on F2 is strictly positive while the coefficient on se
2 is strictly neg-
ative. Thus, if the supply shock variance is not too large, central bank independence when the
bank has an optimal inflation target but cares only for inflation might be better than a central
bank that stabilizes output but does not keep in mind the government’s finances.
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